Tuesday, November 15, 2005
SENT Tu, NOV. 16, 2004
Below is a reproduction of the first piece I had published last year dealing with the Orange Revolution (or before). You can read the online version of the local Minneapolis paper in which it was published here, or you can read below.
UKRAINE VOTES FOR FUTURE AMIDST WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION:
Thirteen years after its declaration of independence was the final nail in the coffin of the USSR, Ukraine is in the fight of its life for the kind of post-Soviet future it will pursue. On October 31 a first round of presidential elections occurred that have been widely condemned as rife with violations of the protocols of free and fair elections, including the use of physical intimidation and violence by authorities. According to the official count by Ukraine’s government, no candidate received 50% of the vote necessary to be declared winner. The two leaders in the first round, the status quo candidate Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, will square off in a second round on November 21.
There is little doubt that the first round was rigged to the benefit of Yanukovych. Independent counts show that Yushchenko gained a clear majority over him, and taking into consideration the effect of widespread violations and the fact that the government, for undisclosed reasons, ceased counting votes in the western part of Ukraine where Yushchenko is most popular and received a clear majority, it appears that Yushchenko in fact already won the election with over 50%.
The present situation in Ukraine leaves much to be desired. The euphoria of independence in 1991 dissipated as the economy tumbled. An oligarchy of ex-Communist Party chiefs and Soviet-era industrial bosses formed, organized in mafia-like clans that seized control of Ukraine’s government and economy. Ukraine’s current president, Leonid Kuchma, was a Soviet factory director and Yanukovych is believed to have risen to power through “the Donetsk clan.” The backhanded business dealings and outright theft of foreign aid money by oligarchs caused many investors and development agencies to flee Ukraine, while oligarchs’ pillaging of Ukraine’s domestic wealth has left most Ukrainians hovering in poverty. The economy has begun to rebound, but not before an estimated 7 million have left to work abroad.
Ukraine is a nation of strategic importance to Russia and the West. Ukraine participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and the West looks forward to a democratic Ukraine someday joining the EU. Russia seeks Ukraine’s cooperation in creating a Single Economic Space, and Russian oil and gas exports to the EU cross Ukraine’s territory. The West generally prefers Yushchenko, while Putin endorses Yanukovych.
Yanukovych is the darling of authorities in Ukraine, committed to preserving oligarchic rule. He is backed by a coalition of parties allied with outgoing President Kuchma, one of the most controversial figures of the post-Soviet world. In 200?, evidence emerged implicating him in the murder of the opposition journalist Gregory Gongadze. In the “Kuchmagate” scandal that resulted, demonstrations occurred calling for Kuchma’s ouster and prosecution. Kuchma survived, but with his reputation and power shaken. 30 journalists have been killed or disappeared in Ukraine since 1991, but none since Gongadze. Nonetheless, attacks and intimidation of oppositionists remain par for the course.
Kuchmagate was pivotal in the development of the opposition. Both parliamentary and grassroots oppositions already existed since 1991, but without much unity and effect. Opposition to authorities spread after Kuchma sacked Yushchenko from his post as prime minister. As prime minister, Yushchenko oversaw reforms that resulted in payment of months-overdue pensions and wages, and began reform of the energy sector, Ukraine’s most corrupt sector of the economy from whence many oligarchs sprang. After his ouster, the parliamentary opposition overall unified, and the subsequent Kuchmagate actions galvanized unity between parliamentary and grassroots oppositions, united today in effort to uproot the oligarchy, presently by electing Yushchenko as president.
It is widely viewed that Kuchma and other oligarchs fear prosecution under an opposition government for crimes committed in their pursuit of power. Kuchma has therefore used so-called “administrative resources,” a series of control mechanisms over the media and cabinet ministries at the disposal of the President, to promote Yanukovych. State television networks have been ordered to give positive spin and more airtime to Yanukovych. Non-state networks have been threatened with bogus lawsuits and subjected to other intimidation tactics for not towing the official line, and activist organizations agitating for fair elections have been accused of fostering terrorism.
Nonetheless, Yanukovych is popular in portions of Ukraine’s electorate. A significant number of ethnic Ukrainians support him, but his popularity is greatest in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, where the majority population is Russian. Yanukovych promises to recognize dual-citizenship with Russia, to make Russian a second official language, and to increase cooperation with Russia.
Cultural matters in Ukraine are very sensitive. The government under Kuchma has done little to promote use of the Ukrainian language, and given the very low level of investment and prestige accorded to Ukrainian-language arts by the oligarchy, the entertainment industry in Ukraine is dominated by Russian-language variants. Furthermore, given that Ukraine already cooperates tremendously with its northern neighbor, most oppositionists regard Yanukovych as intending more than cooperation. Indeed, Yushchenko’s policies toward Russia are more accurately described as cooperation between equal partners than Yanukovych’s, for whom cooperation means Russian backing of Ukraine’s Russophile oligarchy in return for promises to work for further reintegration of Ukraine with Russia. However, not much of Ukraine’s electorate seems eager to pursue this path: Yanukovych did not perform in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as authorities expected, and the majority in the key central-Ukrainian state and city of Kyiv voted for Yushchenko.
Authorities seem nervous that Ukrainians might carry out their own version of the Rose Revolution that swept the corrupt oligarchy out of power in Georgia last year. Authorities have made statements that demonstrations for fair elections “put undue pressure on the electorate,” and Kuchma organized a military holiday in Kyiv just days before the election, with the result that thousands of soldiers remained in the capital for the first round. Everything hangs in the balance for the second round: Will the authorities dare to repeat again what they did the first round, and if so, will the Ukrainian opposition be able to carry out its own Rose Revolution?
UKRAINE VOTES FOR FUTURE AMIDST WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION:
Thirteen years after its declaration of independence was the final nail in the coffin of the USSR, Ukraine is in the fight of its life for the kind of post-Soviet future it will pursue. On October 31 a first round of presidential elections occurred that have been widely condemned as rife with violations of the protocols of free and fair elections, including the use of physical intimidation and violence by authorities. According to the official count by Ukraine’s government, no candidate received 50% of the vote necessary to be declared winner. The two leaders in the first round, the status quo candidate Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, will square off in a second round on November 21.
There is little doubt that the first round was rigged to the benefit of Yanukovych. Independent counts show that Yushchenko gained a clear majority over him, and taking into consideration the effect of widespread violations and the fact that the government, for undisclosed reasons, ceased counting votes in the western part of Ukraine where Yushchenko is most popular and received a clear majority, it appears that Yushchenko in fact already won the election with over 50%.
The present situation in Ukraine leaves much to be desired. The euphoria of independence in 1991 dissipated as the economy tumbled. An oligarchy of ex-Communist Party chiefs and Soviet-era industrial bosses formed, organized in mafia-like clans that seized control of Ukraine’s government and economy. Ukraine’s current president, Leonid Kuchma, was a Soviet factory director and Yanukovych is believed to have risen to power through “the Donetsk clan.” The backhanded business dealings and outright theft of foreign aid money by oligarchs caused many investors and development agencies to flee Ukraine, while oligarchs’ pillaging of Ukraine’s domestic wealth has left most Ukrainians hovering in poverty. The economy has begun to rebound, but not before an estimated 7 million have left to work abroad.
Ukraine is a nation of strategic importance to Russia and the West. Ukraine participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and the West looks forward to a democratic Ukraine someday joining the EU. Russia seeks Ukraine’s cooperation in creating a Single Economic Space, and Russian oil and gas exports to the EU cross Ukraine’s territory. The West generally prefers Yushchenko, while Putin endorses Yanukovych.
Yanukovych is the darling of authorities in Ukraine, committed to preserving oligarchic rule. He is backed by a coalition of parties allied with outgoing President Kuchma, one of the most controversial figures of the post-Soviet world. In 200?, evidence emerged implicating him in the murder of the opposition journalist Gregory Gongadze. In the “Kuchmagate” scandal that resulted, demonstrations occurred calling for Kuchma’s ouster and prosecution. Kuchma survived, but with his reputation and power shaken. 30 journalists have been killed or disappeared in Ukraine since 1991, but none since Gongadze. Nonetheless, attacks and intimidation of oppositionists remain par for the course.
Kuchmagate was pivotal in the development of the opposition. Both parliamentary and grassroots oppositions already existed since 1991, but without much unity and effect. Opposition to authorities spread after Kuchma sacked Yushchenko from his post as prime minister. As prime minister, Yushchenko oversaw reforms that resulted in payment of months-overdue pensions and wages, and began reform of the energy sector, Ukraine’s most corrupt sector of the economy from whence many oligarchs sprang. After his ouster, the parliamentary opposition overall unified, and the subsequent Kuchmagate actions galvanized unity between parliamentary and grassroots oppositions, united today in effort to uproot the oligarchy, presently by electing Yushchenko as president.
It is widely viewed that Kuchma and other oligarchs fear prosecution under an opposition government for crimes committed in their pursuit of power. Kuchma has therefore used so-called “administrative resources,” a series of control mechanisms over the media and cabinet ministries at the disposal of the President, to promote Yanukovych. State television networks have been ordered to give positive spin and more airtime to Yanukovych. Non-state networks have been threatened with bogus lawsuits and subjected to other intimidation tactics for not towing the official line, and activist organizations agitating for fair elections have been accused of fostering terrorism.
Nonetheless, Yanukovych is popular in portions of Ukraine’s electorate. A significant number of ethnic Ukrainians support him, but his popularity is greatest in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, where the majority population is Russian. Yanukovych promises to recognize dual-citizenship with Russia, to make Russian a second official language, and to increase cooperation with Russia.
Cultural matters in Ukraine are very sensitive. The government under Kuchma has done little to promote use of the Ukrainian language, and given the very low level of investment and prestige accorded to Ukrainian-language arts by the oligarchy, the entertainment industry in Ukraine is dominated by Russian-language variants. Furthermore, given that Ukraine already cooperates tremendously with its northern neighbor, most oppositionists regard Yanukovych as intending more than cooperation. Indeed, Yushchenko’s policies toward Russia are more accurately described as cooperation between equal partners than Yanukovych’s, for whom cooperation means Russian backing of Ukraine’s Russophile oligarchy in return for promises to work for further reintegration of Ukraine with Russia. However, not much of Ukraine’s electorate seems eager to pursue this path: Yanukovych did not perform in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as authorities expected, and the majority in the key central-Ukrainian state and city of Kyiv voted for Yushchenko.
Authorities seem nervous that Ukrainians might carry out their own version of the Rose Revolution that swept the corrupt oligarchy out of power in Georgia last year. Authorities have made statements that demonstrations for fair elections “put undue pressure on the electorate,” and Kuchma organized a military holiday in Kyiv just days before the election, with the result that thousands of soldiers remained in the capital for the first round. Everything hangs in the balance for the second round: Will the authorities dare to repeat again what they did the first round, and if so, will the Ukrainian opposition be able to carry out its own Rose Revolution?
